Milton and Rose Friedman's "Free to Choose" and its impact in the global movement toward free market policy: 1979-2003 by Peter J. Boettke
137
Milton and Rose Friedman’s 
“Free to Choose” and Its Impact 
in the Global Movement Toward
Free Market Policy: 1979–2003
Peter J. Boettke
n 1964, Lyndon Johnson defeated Barry Goldwater for the presidency of the
United States by the overwhelming margin of 61 percent of the popular vote
to 38 percent, and in terms of states won, the figure was forty-four to six.
Barry Goldwater ran a campaign calling for less government and freer markets,
and the population said no to him and yes to Lyndon Johnson’s big government
programs of the 1960s, for example, the War on Poverty. However, in the 1980
election, Ronald Reagan was able to defeat the incumbent president, Jimmy
Carter, with 51 percent of the popular vote to 41 percent, and in terms of states,
forty-four states to six states, running on essentially a similar platform to Gold-
water’s.
Obviously, something had drastically changed in that intervening sixteen
years in the United States. For sure, a good part of that was the failure of the
welfare/warfare state in the 1960s and 1970s. The U.S. economy in the 1970s
was suffering from declining productivity, growing public debt, and inflation.
The declining stature of the United States as the economic leader in the world
was matched by a declining stature as a military superpower—as the frustra-
tions of Vietnam fed into the failed policies in the Middle East, most obviously
brought home by the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979. Reagan ran on a platform
to reverse all of that, and in so doing he captured the imaginations of many. In
particular, his rhetoric of uncompromising adherence to free market economics
signaled a change in political rhetoric and public opinion.
Since the beginning of the progressive era, laissez-faire economics had
been on the run from intellectuals and politicians and, since the Great Depres-
sion, the general public. There were, of course, lone wolf voices bucking this
trend all along: Ludwig Mises, F. A. Hayek, Henry Hazlitt, and Ayn Rand being
perhaps the most prominent in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. In the 1940s, a
superstar economist emerged to add his voice to these lone wolves and chal-
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lenge the Keynesian hegemony in the economics profession and the conven-
tional wisdom in the court of public opinion—Milton Friedman. Friedman’s
accomplishments as an economist, and as the premier public intellectual in the
second half of the twentieth century for economic liberalism, are well known,
so that is not what I am going to emphasize here. Instead, I want to focus on
how his work in conveying the basic principles of economic liberalism changed
public attitudes in the United States and abroad among the political elite, the
intelligentsia, and the educated public, and, in particular, how that success in
changing the climate of public opinion in the West in turn represented a beacon
of hope to those in East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union during
the years leading up to the collapse of communism in 1989 and 1991. 
There are many hypotheses about why the communist system collapsed in
the late 1980s and early 1990s. One is that a Polish pope gave legitimacy to the
Church behind the Iron Curtain and the unrest with Solidarity discredited the
Workers’ State in Poland. Once the Polish communist regime collapsed, the others
followed. Another hypothesis is that Ronald Reagan’s decision to up the military
stakes highlighted the technological gap between the economic systems and top-
pled the system. Still another hypothesis is that a generation of political leaders
from within the communist system that came of age during 1956 (the “thaw gen-
eration”) and knew firsthand of Stalin’s crimes against humanity had decided that
this was no way for a civilized people to live. I cannot do justice to all these com-
peting hypotheses here, but I want to suggest an alternative one and provide evi-
dence of its plausibility—namely, that the economic failures of the real-existing
communist system in East and Central Europe made sense only in light of the
ideas of economic liberalism.
1 And in the 1980s, no one had stated those ideas
more plainly and concisely than Milton and Rose Friedman in Free to Choose.
2
FROM CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM TO FREE TO CHOOSE
One way to measure the impact of Milton Friedman’s ideas is to simply
compare and contrast the reception of Capitalism and Freedom at the time of
its publication in 1962 with that of Free to Choose in 1980. As the Friedmans
inform us in their memoirs, the intellectual climate of opinion at the time of
Capitalism and Freedom was, to put it mildly, hostile (Friedman and Friedman
1998, 339). Milton Friedman states in the preface to the 1982 edition of Capi-
talism and Freedom that when it was first published in 1962,
its views were so far out of the mainstream that it was not reviewed by any
major national publication—not by the New York Times or the Herald Tri-
bune (then still being published in New York) or the Chicago Tribune or by
Time or Newsweek or even the Saturday Review—though it was reviewed
by the London Economist and by the major professional journals. And this
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U.S. university, and destined to sell more than 400,000 copies in the next
eighteen years. It is inconceivable that such a publication by an economist
of comparable professional standing but favorable to the welfare state or
socialism or communism would have received a similar silent treatment.
(Friedman 1982, vi)
The publication of Free to Choose would provide the exact opposite experi-
ence for the Friedmans.
3 The book sold 400,000 copies in hardcover and as a
mass market paperback has sold millions of copies and been translated into
over a dozen languages.
4 Perhaps an even better measure, though harder to put
a precise number to, is how proposals first discussed in Capitalism and Free-
dom (and considered too radical for respectable conversation) have now
become commonplace: monetary rules versus discretionary policy, private cer-
tification on the market rather than government licensure, school vouchers and
competition in education versus government monopoly, and the flat tax versus
a progressive income tax are but a few examples of how Friedman was the trail-
blazer for creative applications of market thinking to areas of public policy.
In Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman sought to establish an argument
about the interconnectedness of economic and political freedom. It was possi-
ble, he argued, to have limited political freedom while adopting policies of eco-
nomic freedom, but it was impossible to eliminate economic freedom without
also infringing on the political freedoms of individuals. Moreover, economic
freedom would put pressures on the political system to open up. In contrast to
the popular position among intellectuals that political and economic freedom
could be separated neatly, Friedman put forth the following historical challenge:
Historical experience speaks with a single voice on the relation between
political freedom and a free market. I know of no example in time or place
of a society that has been marked by a large measure of political freedom,
and that has not also used something comparable to a free market to organ-
ize the bulk of economic activity. (Friedman 1982, 9)
While Capitalism and Freedom is in many ways a more philosophical and
foundational book than Free to Choose, the basic teachings of economic liberal-
ism are conveyed even more forcefully and the applications more persuasive
than in the earlier book. Moreover, Free to Choose is more explicit in its use of
ideas such as the informational role of prices, the spontaneous order of the mar-
ket system, and the interest group logic of political interference with the mar-
ket. These aspects of the theoretical foundations of liberalism were not empha-
sized in the early 1960s but emerged more explicitly with the development of
public choice theory by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in The Calculus
of Consent (1962) and the theory of spontaneous order in F. A. Hayek’s work
from The Constitution of Liberty (1960) to Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973,
1976, 1979).
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power of the market system is its ability to mobilize the incentives of individu-
als to realize the gains from mutually beneficial exchange, and that the price
system is an indispensable aid in this endeavor by discovering the relevant
information and communicating it to the relevant actors within the system, who
in turn utilize it efficiently in realizing their individual plans. On the other hand,
the attempt by government to interfere in the market order results in perverse
incentives, distorted information, and the catering of special interests that con-
centrates benefits on well-organized and well-informed interest groups and dis-
perses the costs among the unorganized and ill-informed mass of voters.
The Friedmans summarize the functions of prices in a market economy
as follows: “Prices perform three functions in organizing economic activity:
first, they transmit information; second, they provide an incentive to adopt
those methods of production that are least costly and thereby use available
resources for the most highly valued purposes; third, they determine who gets
how much of the product—the distribution of income” (Friedman and Fried-
man 1980, 6). The price system constitutes an intricate web of information and
incentives. Attempts by government to substitute control for voluntary
exchange often result in a failure to rectify whatever perceived problem was
used to justify government action in the first place and, in fact, often exacer-
bate the problem by imposing costs on some parties and concentrating bene-
fits on others. Freedom of trade fosters cooperation and harmony of interests
among diverse parties. Controls lead to conflicts and special interest politics:
“There is, as it were, an invisible hand in politics that operates in precisely the
opposite direction of Adam Smith’s invisible hand. Individuals who intend only
to promote the general interest are led by the invisible political hand to pro-
mote a special interest that they had no intention to promote” (Friedman and
Friedman 1980, 281).
Free to Choose leaves its reader with a clear message about the power of
the market to harness individual initiative and knowledge of time and place, the
importance of property rights and the rule of law in enabling individuals to real-
ize the gains from exchange and to preserve our personal freedom, the failure
of government policy to achieve the goals set, the vulnerability of government
policy to opportunistic behavior by special interests, and the threat to human
liberty that government intervention in the economy represents. While their
message was directed primarily at an audience of U.S. readers, the Friedmans
infused their work with a comparative analysis drawing on examples from Rus-
sia, India, China, and Hong Kong, among other places. The message learned
through this comparative historical analysis is this:
Wherever we find any large element of individual freedom, some measure
of progress in the material comforts at the disposal of ordinary citizens, and
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economic activity is organized mainly through the free market. Wherever the
state undertakes to control in detail the economic activities of its citizens,
wherever, that is, detailed central economic planning reigns, there ordinary
citizens are in political fetters, have a low standard of living, and have little
power to control their own destiny. (Friedman and Friedman 1980, 46)
It is this broad sweeping judgment that would serve as an inspiration and
catalyst for dissident economists within the former Soviet Union to push for eco-
nomic and political change in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
THE INDIRECT AND DIRECT INFLUENCE OF MILTON FRIEDMAN 
IN 1989 AND 1991
The indirect influence of Milton Friedman as the leading intellectual
spokesman for economic liberalism stretches from China to Poland and all
points north and south as well. Only Hayek’s influence would compare.
6 This
indirect influence is revealed anytime a modern economic reformer insists on
the interrelationship between economic freedom and political freedom, on the
necessity of private property and the freedom of contract, on the importance of
rule-bound monetary and fiscal policy, on the perverse consequences of gov-
ernment regulation, and on the special interest groups that form the tyranny of
the status quo. Friedman made it respectable for economists to argue in favor
of free markets and offer market solutions to public policy questions. In his own
attempts to provide market solutions in public debates, Friedman originated
many of the ideas that defined not only the Thatcher and Reagan revolutions in
the 1980s, but would define transition policies in Poland, the Czech Republic,
and Russia in the 1990s. Many of these ideas were forged in Friedman’s attempts
in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to address vexing policy problems in the United
States, UK, India, Israel, Latin America, and China.
Far from just the figurehead of the political philosophy and political econ-
omy of classical liberalism that many of the reformers embraced in their re-
jection of the previous socialist system, Friedman was also an inspiration for
many of the policy proposals adopted. The Friedmans did not dare in 1980
believe that communism would topple in a decade, but they also didn’t rule that
option out:
[L]etting the genie of private initiative out of the bottle even to this limited
extent [context is Yugoslavia in the 1970s] will give rise to political problems
that, sooner or later, are likely to produce a reaction toward great authori-
tarianism. The opposite outcome, the collapse of communism and its replace-
ment by a market system, seems far less likely, though as incurable opti-
mists, we do not rule it out completely.
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The problem with the real-existing systems in Soviet bloc countries could
not be tackled coherently with minor reforms to the socialist system. The prob-
lem wasn’t with this or that aspect of the system but the entire system.
8
Milton Friedman (1984), in a pamphlet for the Centre for Research into
Communist Economies, summed up his position on the problems of trying to
introduce markets into a command economy by stating,
I believe this way of putting it is upside down. The real question is how far
one can go in introducing command elements into a market economy. I
believe it would be literally impossible for any large-scale economy to be
operated on a strictly command basis. Fundamentally, what enables a coun-
try such as China or the Soviet Union to function at all is the market ele-
ments that are either deliberately introduced or are inadvertently permitted
to operate. When I speak of market elements being introduced into com-
mand economies such as China’s and the Soviet Union’s, I am not speaking
of free markets; they are highly distorted markets. That is why those coun-
tries have such low standards of living; that is why they are so inefficient.
(Friedman 1984, 8)
The power of Friedman’s observations of the failure of the real-existing
socialist economies of the Soviet bloc was not lost on those in charge of design-
ing the reforms for those economies. Abel Aganbegyan, one of Gorbachev’s
main economic advisors during the 1980s, describes his meeting with Milton
Friedman in San Francisco as follows:
I was astonished by his fantastic faith in private property, a faith that
excluded the possibility of any other kind of property ownership such as that
which exists in the socialist countries. In Friedman’s opinion, well-being can
be reached only through private ownership of property, a free market and
the existence of banks completely independent from the state and serving
that free market.…But if we move away from conceptual problems to the
concrete theories advanced by Milton Friedman in his studies, we find that
many of them can be of great use to us. In a number of cases Friedman
points to examples of financial misjudgement by the state in increasing
expenditure, printing excess money and so on. And while I do not accept
his view that the socialist countries should transfer property into private
ownership, I nevertheless listened with great interest to his explanations of
the present inflation in China, which he had recently visited, and in other
socialist countries. (Aganbegyan 1989, 52–53)
The Gorbachev reform team lacked the imagination to embrace private
property and the market economy, and instead the inconsistency in their reform
efforts led to the unraveling of the Soviet system. 
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team at the end of the Gorbachev period and then into the Yeltsin years, Mil-
ton Friedman’s influence was again repeatedly recognized. In her book Sale of
the Century, Chrystia Freeland makes this stunning observation: “It was, of
course, an absurd decision. Here was Gaidar, an ardent capitalist, a fan of F. A.
Hayek and Milton Friedman, a man who thought the welfare state in Western
Europe was far too large and would have voted for Ronald Reagan, shaping the
economic ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It was
like asking a crusading atheist to write a new catechism for the Vatican” (Free-
land 2000, 29).
9
Friedman’s insights into the nature of real-existing communist economies
were important for a variety of reasons that would later prove crucial during the
transition period. It was the distorted market economy that failed in 1989 and
1991, with the social networks and political interconnections that had been
formed under the incentives of that distorted system. The system led to dispro-
portionate power to those in politically privileged positions, inefficiencies in
production due to perverse incentives and the distorted signals of administered
prices, and lacked any incentive for innovation, change, and progress. As Fried-
man would put it during a trip to China in 1988, “The problems of overcoming
vested interests, of frustrating rent-seeking, apply to almost every attempt to
change government policy, whether the change involves privatization, or eliminat-
ing military bases, or reducing subsidies, or anything else” (Friedman 1990, 94).
In order to defeat the vested interests and transition to a free market econ-
omy, Friedman counseled that reformers move quickly and decisively. The dis-
cussion is subtle because Friedman admits that “slow and steady” may outper-
form “one fell swoop” under certain conditions, and in particular may
outperform with regard to issues of equity and political sustainability of the
reforms. But ultimately, the arguments for economic efficiency, and the reality
that gradualism enables vested interests to organize and fight against change,
leads one to lean toward quick and decisive moves in economic policy. This
does not mean that reformers should give little thought to the political sustain-
ability of reforms. Instead, as Friedman highlights, there are a few basic ways to
address the tyranny of the status quo in economic reform. One way, followed
in the case of British Telecom, is to try to create stakeholders from the vested
interests so they will see the benefits of privatization. As Friedman warns, the
problem with this approach is if you end up simply substituting a private
monopoly for a government monopoly, the politically connected will fight to
maintain an effective barrier to entry in the respective industry.
10 To avoid this
problem, Friedman himself advocated a free distribution of shares in the state
enterprises and then allowing citizens to freely buy or sell the shares in an open
market. And, finally, rather than fighting the existing monopoly head-on, the
reformer could simply eliminate the government-enforced barrier to entry in the
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of direct competitors or technological innovations that change the nature of the
industry.
11
While we have seen that the different economists in Russia acknowledged
Friedman’s influence in framing their discussions, the most successful economic
reformers in Poland and the Czech Republic borrowed from Friedman more
than a frame of reference. Poland’s finance minister, Leszek Balcerowicz, has
turned to Friedman to find practical ideas from monetary stabilization to priva-
tization to the flat tax.
12 Jeffrey Sachs (1993, 87), Anders Aslund (2002, 256), and
Marshall Goldman (2003, 196) all credit Friedman as the “godfather” of the
voucher privatization proposals that circulated throughout transition economies. 
Perhaps the strongest endorsement of a direct influence of Milton Friedman
guiding the transition experience comes from Vaclav Klaus, and thus it is worth
quoting him at length from a speech he gave at the Prague School of Econom-
ics on the occasion of awarding an honorary doctorate to Milton Friedman on
April 17, 1997:
Reading and studying Milton Friedman’s works helped me and many of us
to understand economic reality, to understand economics, to understand its
methodology, the role of the market in society, the role of the state in a free
market economy, the role of money in the economy etc. Surely there were
other influential authors but there was no one comparable in intellectual and
human integrity, in firmness of stances and attitudes, in innovative bold-
ness, in simplicity and clarity of exposition and in the scope and quality of
important contributions both to economic theory and to the theory of pub-
lic policy.
Milton Friedman is, however, not only a theoretician in the very rigorous dis-
cipline of economic science. He is, at the same time, a true believer in the
unrestricted market economy and I believe that his books Capitalism and
Freedom, together with a more recent Free to Choose, opened the eyes of
whole generations of not scholars but of ordinary citizens on all continents
of this planet.
All that helped us to understand the tenets of the old communist regime and
its oppressive character and economic irrationality. With Milton Friedman’s
works as our background we had no dreams about the so-called third ways,
about perestroika, about the reformability of communism. Milton Friedman
helped us to interpret the actual communist economy not as a textbook com-
mand economy, based on directives going in the vertical direction from the
central planning commission at the top to individual firms but as a very
strange and truncated market economy with imperfect, but nevertheless
dominant horizontal relations among economic agents at the microlevel. Mil-
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spontaneity of exchange, implicit if not explicit prices, wide-spread bargain-
ing etc. It was a very rare attitude at that time.
At the same time, the works of Milton Friedman helped us to understand the
logic of the transformation of a communist country into a free society and a
full-fledged market economy. Because of him, we had a clear vision where
to go and a pragmatic strategy how to get there. We did not want to master-
mind the whole process because it would not be possible and definitely not
successful. We knew we had to trust free citizens to create the new world—
with a moderate help from the above only.
Klaus’s words touch on the themes we have emphasized as coming out of
Capitalism and Freedom and Free to Choose with regard to the power of mar-
kets and the tyranny of controls, and clearly state how Friedman’s ideas guided
the construction of economic policy during the transition.
How have these policies fared? If you listen to the popular press and left-
leaning academics, then you will hear about social disruptions and a general
discrediting of market reforms in East and Central Europe and the former Soviet
Union. But the popular rhetoric is often divorced considerably from the reality
of the situation, especially as compared with merely a decade ago.
13 As Vladimir
Dlouhy, the former minister of industry and trade of the Czech Republic has put
it: “If someone would have told me in 1989 that by 2009 we would have a cap-
italist economy, the rule of law, a stable democracy, European integration, etc.,
etc., I would have told them they were crazy. When you look at the immediate
past, you become a pessimist. When you look at a longer term horizon, the
progress is breathtaking.”
14 Of course, mistakes were made, and the corrupting
influence of interest group politics is ever present. Intellectually, we now know
that we must emphasize the necessity of certain key institutions in order for
markets to work as effectively as we might hope—a point that is implicit in the
Friedman analysis of the power of the market and tyranny of controls, but now
must be made more explicit, as has been repeatedly stressed by James
Buchanan (1997), Ronald Coase (1992), and Douglass North (1994). Moreover,
culture and history no doubt represent a significant constraint on our ability to
establish a successful market economy in the former communist economies, as
recently stressed by Steve Pejovich (2003). 
The impact of culture and history is not felt in terms of economic per-
formance of market-oriented reforms if they were implemented.
15 Privatization
and competition will lead to gains in productive efficiency and with that, wealth.
But the culture and history of a country can impede the long-term legitimacy of
the private property order and thus reverse the policy mix in a country. This
leads us back to the project of the Friedmans—to educate not just the intellec-
tuals of any society but also the citizenry. The economic liberal’s project is not
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intellectual climate of opinion toward an appreciation of the liberal project of
constraining the government and encouraging the voluntary cooperation of
individuals in society.
16 And here we can hope that the peoples of the former
socialist economies will continue to benefit from the teachings of the Friedmans.
In 1980, they ended Free to Choose with an optimistic chapter pointing out that
“The Tide Is Turning.” The call to action that the Friedmans make is character-
istically straightforward:
Needless to say, those of us who want to halt and reverse the recent trend
should oppose additional specific measures to expand further the power and
scope of government, urge repeal and reform of existing measures, and try
to elect legislators and executives who share that view. But that is not an
effective way to reverse the growth of government. It is doomed to failure.
Each of us would defend our own special privileges and try to limit gov-
ernment at someone else’s expense. We would be fighting a many-headed
hydra that would grow new heads faster than we could cut the old ones off. 
Our founding fathers have shown us a more promising way to proceed: by
package deals, as it were. We should adopt self-denying ordinances that limit
the objectives we try to pursue through political channels. We should not
consider each case on its merits, but lay down broad rules limiting what gov-
ernment may do. (Friedman and Friedman 1980, 287)
The danger is when a people forget that one of the most basic truths in
human affairs is that the greatest threat to our freedom and our ability to real-
ize peaceful social cooperation is the concentration of power in the hands of
few. As the Friedmans warned, we had deluded ourselves in the twentieth cen-
tury into believing that the concentration of power was not a threat as long as
that power was to be used for good purposes (Friedman and Friedman 1980,
297). The costs to humanity were great, and nowhere as great as to those peo-
ples who had to endure the good intentions of communism.
17 Hopefully, the
reformers-turned-political-leaders learned not only how to privatize their
economies but also how to constitutionally constrain their governments from
the wisdom of Milton Friedman.
CONCLUSION
We live in a world where activists take to the streets to protest globaliza-
tion and the inhumanity of capitalism, and at the same time are wearing sneak-
ers constructed in Indonesia, sweaters made in England, pants made in the
United States, and gas masks made in Canada. Of course, a free market econo-
mist himself can find fault with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
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protestors’ argument. On the other hand, they contend that the spread of mar-
kets throughout the world generates a race to the bottom in terms of labor pol-
icy and environmental control, and reinforces an unequal distribution of
resources between rich and poor nations.
The logic of economic reasoning and the evidence point in the opposite
direction. Markets are the most effective means available to improve the lot of
mankind by spreading the international division of labor and increasing the pro-
ductive capacity of mankind. Increases in real income can result only from
increases in real productivity, and increases in real productivity result from
improvements in labor skill, advancements in the stock of technological knowl-
edge, and more effective management and organization of economic produc-
tion within enterprises. Globalization brings all three of these sources of real
productivity gains from the more developed economies to the less developed
ones. Moreover, the expansion of the market area erodes the power of local
monopolies and exposes political leaders to world standards of acceptable pub-
lic policy toward the least advantaged in a society. As the Friedmans contended
in Free to Choose, letting the market genie out of the bottle destabilizes the
monopoly on political power that the ruling elite possess in a command economy.
“A tide of opinion, once it flows strongly, tends to sweep over all obsta-
cles, all contrary views” (Friedman and Friedman 1980, 272). The events of the
world subsequent to the publication of Free to Choose demonstrate the veracity
of this claim. Communism collapsed, development planning in the Third World
was rejected, and even the welfare state in Western democracies has resulted in
fiscal reforms. But there are still those who agitate for more government
involvement in the economy in the name of security—personal, economic, and
national. For those of us who are persuaded by the argument that a people that
is willing to trade off its liberty for security deserves neither, the demand for,
and popularity of, these security measures is a disturbing trend. But perhaps we
might find hope from a region of the world that in fact used to represent one
of the main causes of our security concern in the West: the former communist
economies. As Mats Lars, former prime minister of Estonia, remarked recently in
describing the intellectual climate of opinion in Europe, “The most left wing par-
ties in the new Europe, from an economic policy standpoint, are more right
wing than the most right wing party from the Old Europe.”
18 As I have tried to
suggest here, the prevailing climate of public policy in East and Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union that pushes for market initiative instead of gov-
ernment-provided security is in no small measure due to the powerful message
conveyed in the works of Milton and Rose Friedman and their commitment to
sound economic reasoning and to the philosophy of limited government.148 Peter J. Boettke
NOTES
1 This is actually the hypothesis that is most plausible in the face of the evidence, as I have
argued in Boettke (1993, 3–4, and 2001, 1–6). Also see Boettke, ed. (2000) for an examination
of the century-long debate among economists on the theory and practice of socialism.
2 I take particular delight in this regard from the cartoon from the Christian Science Monitor, and
reproduced in the Friedmans’ memoirs, of a statue of Lenin being replaced with a statue of Mil-
ton Friedman in Poland. See Friedman and Friedman (1998, 513).
3 Milton Friedman has stated on many occasions that he actually considers Capitalism and Free-
dom the superior book to Free to Choose, so the puzzle of the different receptions cannot be
explained by reference to quality.
4 The translations that I could find were as follows: French, 1980; German, 1980; Japanese, 1980;
Norwegian, 1980; Spanish, 1980; Swedish, 1980; Danish, 1981; Italian, 1981; Portuguese, 1981;
Chinese, 1982; Finnish, 1982; Hebrew, 1988; Polish, 1988, 1994; Czech, 1992; Estonian, 1992.
5 The focus on the informational role of the price system was an aspect of Hayek’s economic
thought that was widely accepted from the 1940s. However, the development of “information
economics” would not occur until the 1960s, after George Stigler’s seminal paper on the topic.
Moreover, while Friedman and Hayek were close intellectual allies in the battle against social-
ism, especially in their work with the Mont Pelerin Society, the emphasis on spontaneous order
is more identified with Hayek than Friedman. But see the discussion in Free to Choose where
they discuss language, science, and culture as examples of how complex and sophisticated
orders can arise as the unintended consequence of individuals pursuing their own interests.
See Friedman and Friedman (1980, 16–19).
6 A comparison of the scientific impact of Hayek and Friedman, however, weights strongly in favor
of Friedman. When I did The Intellectual Legacy of F. A. Hayek volumes for the Hayek centen-
nial celebration in 1999, a citation study was conducted, and Friedman dominates over all the
classical liberal economists who have won the Nobel Prize (Buchanan, Coase, and Stigler) and
the older generation of Mises and Knight. See Boettke (1999, xi–xvi).
7 It is important to stress two parts about the Friedmans’ analysis. First, they never fell into the trap
of believing the Soviet system was a textbook model of central planning that could allocate
resources efficiently. Textbook central planning was impossible, but what emerged was a gov-
ernment-regulated market economy that served particular vested interests of the ruling elite
(see Friedman and Friedman 1980, 1–2). Second, while recognizing the military prowess and
threat of communism, the Friedmans never bought into the economic, let alone moral, superi-
ority of the communist system like so many of their contemporaries. Economists such as John
Kenneth Galbraith and Paul Samuelson wrote well into the 1980s about the productive capac-
ity of the socialist system to outperform the capitalist system. In this respect, the analysis by the
Friedmans of the rotting of the socialist system from within and the instability that would be intro-
duced once minor market reforms were implemented was prescient indeed. On the develop-
ment of the implications of the noncentrally planned nature of the Soviet system, see Roberts
(1971) and Boettke (1990, 1993, and 2001). On how the introduction of market reforms and
inconsistent policy shifts caused the downfall of the communist regime under Gorbachev, see
Boettke (1993).Milton and Rose Friedman’s “Free to Choose” 149
8 We learn in their memoirs that the Friedmans had a fascination with learning up close the oper-
ation of different economic systems, including their year-long trip to visit over twenty countries
in the early 1960s (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 279–332). The Friedmans also were involved
in the effort to bring the latest teachings of market economics to economists in the former Soviet
bloc, dating from the mid-1960s. These meetings were held under the auspices of an Italian
research center (CESES) under the direction of Renato Mieli, who worked in cooperation with
G. Warren Nutter (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 338). Nutter was Milton Friedman’s student at
the University of Chicago and challenged the dominant opinion among Sovietologists at the
time that despite whatever political problems the Soviet system confronted, the economy had
performed admirably in lifting a country from a backward peasant economy to an industrialized
economy in less than a generation. Nutter’s (1962) work challenged the growth accounting that
was being done on Soviet-type economies, and his revised figures called for a reassessment of
the economic prowess of the Soviet system. In other work, Nutter (1983) also challenged the
notion that either shadow pricing mechanisms or the decentralization of administration could
provide the incentives and information required to improve the economic performance of the
Soviet-type economy. Markets without private property, Nutter argued forcefully, were a grand
illusion, and without the establishment of private property rights, Soviet reforms were bound to
lead to frustrating results. Nutter was a trailblazer whose works were often dismissed during his
day, only to have them viewed as singularly prescient after the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. For a discussion of the debate over Soviet economic growth figures, see Boettke (1993,
12–45). 
9 Gaidar, in an interview for the PBS series “Commanding Heights,” states in response to a ques-
tion about Milton Friedman’s influence: “Yes, I read Friedman’s books with interest, and also
Hayek. They were very authoritative for us, but all the same far away from our domestic reali-
ties.” 
10 Of course, this is the criticism of the insider deals that were struck in Russia that have led to a
generation of oligarchs. See Goldman (2003). Contrary to these arguments, I would stress with
Boyko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995) that the primary purpose of privatization was “destatization,”
and reform efforts should be judged against that standard. The lingering economic problems in
East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are a consequence not of either “insider”
or “voucher” privatization but the lack of actual implementation of reforms, the partial nature of
many of the reforms that were implemented, and the continuing interference of the state in eco-
nomic life.
11 Friedman (1990, 91) points to changes in communications, such as e-mail, telephone, and fax
machines, as effectively eroding the monopoly power of the U.S. Post Office. On how this ex-
ample of the U.S. Post Office can serve as a general model for transition economies in privati-
zation, see Boettke and Leeson (2003).
12 See Burba (1999) for a discussion of Balcerowicz’s advocacy of the flat tax and the origination
of the idea in Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (1982, 172–76).
13 The empirical record of postcommunism is often clouded by (1) an unreliable base state, as the
official data on the economy at the time of the collapse of communism often overestimates the
economic health of these economies, (2) failure to adequately account for the problems of a
shortage economy, repressed inflation, negative value-added production techniques, etc., that
characterized the Soviet-type economy and thus misinterprets the initial period of the transition150 Peter J. Boettke
in terms of price adjustments and the reallocation of labor and capital, and (3) failure to incor-
porate into the analysis the unofficial economy that emerges as individuals attempt to evade the
regulations, registration fees, and taxation of the official system even after so-called reforms
have been implemented. These problems are discussed in Boettke and Leeson (2003).
14 Personal interview by Peter Boettke, Scott Beaulier, and Susan Anderson with Vladimir Dlouhy
at his office in Prague on July 14, 2003.
15 The results obtained from both the Index of Economic Freedom and the Economic Freedom
Index are clear on this: Economic freedom (security of private property, freedom of pricing,
sound money, fiscal responsibility, low taxes, nonintrusive regulation, and open international
trade) is positively correlated with economic growth. It is just not the case that countries can
score low on these different indices of economic freedom and experience significant economic
growth and improvements in the standard of living of the average citizens in their country. An
online description of the Economic Freedom Index is available at www.freetheworld.com.
16 As stressed by Milton Friedman, the classical liberal economist will do a disservice to his cause
if he allows his ideological position to crowd out his positive economic analysis. Instead, the
case for classical liberalism must be grounded in sound economic analysis. To accomplish this,
the economist should in the first instance engage in a positive analysis of any policy proposal
by treating the ends of that proposal as public-spirited and unobjectionable from a broadly
accepted moral standard (for example, we want to help the least advantaged in society). Then
subject that proposed policy to economic analysis, with the surprising result that much of what
is advocated in the name of the public interest actually fails to promote that objective. Con-
fronted with this knowledge of the conclusions of positive economic analysis, politicians should
abandon their previous policy and pursue one more suited to meet the stated objectives. In the
face of repeated failures to respond to the logic and evidence provided by sound economic
analysis, Friedman then suggests that the economist can offer a positive analysis of the politi-
cal process of policymaking. At this level, the logic and evidence lead one to expose how spe-
cial interest groups operate in concert with politicians and a permanent bureaucracy to con-
centrate benefits on the well-organized and disperse benefits on the unorganized and establish
effective constraints on any attempt to change the status quo. Again, values are not unwarrant-
edly imported into the analysis. The conclusions that emerge about the inertia of the status quo
and the logic of concentrated benefits and dispersed costs are derived through sound eco-
nomic reasoning. Finally, in building the positive construction of a constitution of economic pol-
icy, Friedman argues that we need to learn from thinkers such as Adam Smith and Thomas Jef-
ferson and build institutional constraints that will enable “bad men” to do least harm, rather than
free “good men” to accomplish all that they intend. Free to Choose is a perfect illustration of how
to engage in each of these levels of analysis in political economy. 
17 See R. J. Rummel (1994) and Courtois et al. (1999).
18 Remarks at the graduation ceremonies of the American Institute for Political and Economic
Studies (Fund for American Studies) at Charles University, August 2, 2003.
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